In this paper we present a variational calculus approach to Principal-Agent problem with a lump-sum payment on finite horizon in degenerate stochastic systems, such as filtered partially observed linear systems. Our work extends the existing methodologies in the Principal-Agent literature using dynamic programming and BSDE representation of the contracts in the non-degenerate controlled stochastic systems. We first solve the Principal's problem in an enlarged set of contracts defined by a forward-backward SDE system given by the first order condition of the Agent's problem using variational calculus. Then we use the sufficient condition of the Agent's problem to verify that the optimal contract that we obtain by solving the Principal's problem is indeed implementable (i.e. belonging to the admissible contract set). Importantly we consider the control problem in a weak formulation. Finally, we give explicit solution of the Principal-Agent problem in partially observed linear systems and extend our results to some mean field interacting Agents case.
Introduction
Moral hazard is one of the prime risks of systemic instability and inefficiency, as already pointed out by Adam Smith. Finding the optimal contract between two parties -The Principal and the Agent, when the Agent's effort cannot be observed therefore cannot be contracted upon, is a classical moral hazard problem in microeconomics. Applications can be widely found in corporate finance, portfolio management [4] and more recently energy transition [1, 2] .
While the research on discrete-time models dated further back, the first continuous-time model was proposed in the seminal work of Holmström and Milgrom [16] , in which they study a simplified model with lump-sum payment on finite horizon while assuming the Agent controls only the drift of the state process. They show that the optimal contract should be linear in aggregate output when the Agent has CARA utility functions with a monetary cost of effort. Their work has been extended by Schättler and Sung [29, 30] , Sung [31, 32] , Müller [23, 24] , Hellwig and Schmidt [15] . Later Williams [33] , Cvitanić, Wan and Zhang [8] use the stochastic maximum principle and forward-backward stochastic differential equations (abbreviated FBSDE) to characterize the optimal compensation for more general utility functions.
Many different continuous-time models have been proposed in the past few decades, notably the one introduced by Sannikov in his seminal paper [28] . He considered Principal-Agent problem on infinite horizon with continuous payment while allowing Principal to fire or retire the Agent at any time. From a mathematical perspective, his approach sheds light on the contracting relationship in Princpal-Agent's problem using dynamic programming and leads to simple computational procedure to find the optimal contract by, in his case, solving an ordinary differential equation.
More recently, Sannikov's idea was reinterpreted and extended by Cvitanić, Possamaï and Touzi [7] to a more general set-up with a more direct and easier approach. We shall illustrate their contribution in the following toy model. Denote by ξ the contract paid at the end of a finite time interval [0, T ]. Let's consider the following optimization for the Agent:
The crucial observation in [7] is that both the contract ξ and the Agent's best response α * [ξ] can be characterized by the following backward stochastic differential equation (in short, BSDE, for readers not familiar with BSDE we refer to [10, 25] , and in particular to [9] for the applications on the contract theory): 
, for all t ∈ [0, T ] for some (Y 0 , Z), and this neat representation transforms the once puzzling principal's problem to be a classical stochastic control problem, namely,
This idea of representation is further applied to study the case where the Principal can hire multiple Agents e.g. [11] , [12] or Agent facing multiple Principals e.g. [21] , [18] using the formulation of mean field games (as for the mean field game we refer to the seminal paper [20] and the recent books [5] and [6] ). However, the method relies on an important hypothesis: the stochastic system is nondegenerate. More specifically, at the heart of the dynamic programming approach to Principal-Agent problem lies the BSDE representation of the contract as shown in the above example, which requires the non-degeneracy of the system.
It is well known that degenerate stochastic systems appear naturally in partially observed systems when we replace the non-observable part of the system by the filtered process, i.e. the conditional law of the unobservable given the observable, see e.g. [3] . One of the simplest cases of partial observed system is system with parameter uncertainty. This is studied by Fernandes and Phelan [14] , Williams [34] , then by Prat and Jovanovic [27] , which inspires and motivates this work. To illustrate the idea, consider the following process
where β is the control of the Agent and µ represents a unknown parameter of the system which is called the time-invariant productivity. The common priors on µ are normal with mean m 0 and variance V 0 . Using Bayes' formula and replace µ by the posteriors, which depend on B t and the cumulative effort A t := t 0 β s ds, we get the following controlled system:
where V t = σ 2 V 0 σ 2 +V 0 t is the posterior variance and (I t ) t≥0 is a F B -adapted Brownian motion called the innovation process. The partially observed state process (1.1) becomes now a degenerate controlled system with a new degenerate process (A t ) t≥0 . Since the process A is not observable by the Principal, it cannot be contracted upon. Indeed, to compute the posteriors on µ at time t, one needs to know the Agent's control β up to time t. The main difficulty is to find a dynamic representation of the contracts but using only the observable part of the system, namely in the above case the process B.
In this paper we consider general degenerate controlled system in a weak formulation, allowing the drift and the volatility of the filtered process (i.e. degenerate part of the system, denoted throughout the paper by X) be controlled by the Agent. We assume that the observable part of the system (i.e. non-degenerate part of the system, denoted throughout the paper by the process B) is controlled by the Agent only via the drift. We give the first order condition of the Agent's optimal control when he is given a contract. The first order condition is described by a path-dependent FBSDE. Contrary to the FBSDE literature, by path-dependent we mean the coefficients of the FBSDE dependent on the path of the forward process. In the Principal-Agent problem, the dependency mainly comes from the Agent's cost function and the contract. The wellposedness of these kinds of FBSDE is of independent interest and is studied in the accompanying paper [17] . Our strategy is to solve the Principal's problem first over the set of contracts described by the FBSDE given by the first order condition of the Agent's problem. The contracts described by the FBSDE may not necessarily be implementable, i.e. the optimal control of the Agent's problem may not exist. The implementability is then checked by the sufficient condition of the optimality of the Agent's problem.
The main contribution of the paper is to provide a way to solve the Principal-Agent's problem when only part of the state variables can be contracted upon, which is crucial when the system is partially observed. The rest of the paper is organised as follow. In section 2 we state our moral hazard problem in degenerated systems and give the main results of the paper. The proofs of the results will be given in Section 3. In Section 4 we solve the Principal-Agent problem in partially observed linear systems with explicit optimal contract and extend the result to a specific mean-field interacting Agents case.
2 Principal-Agent Problem in Degenerate Systems
Preliminaries
Let Ω := C [0, T ], R d be the canonical space and B the canonical process. Denote by F = (F B t ) 0≤t≤T the associated filtration and P the Wiener measure. Let A be a compact convex subset of some finite dimensional space. Let
where M n,d (R) denotes the set of n × d matrices with real entries. Throughout this paper we shall be studying control problems in a weak formulation. Denote U the set of admissible controls taking values in A. For any α ∈ U , under the standard global Lipschitz conditions of Assumption 2.5 below, let X be the unique strong solution of the following stochastic differential equation
for some given initial data X 0 . Then we can define dP α | F T :
In the case where the above process is a positive martingale, by Girsanov theorem we can define
Brownian motion under P α and which means that the canonical process B satisfies the following stochastic differential equation
This defines the family of probability measures on Ω
where P(Ω) is the set of all probability measures on Ω.
Problem Formulation
The Agent signs a contract, works for the Principal for a predetermined period T and receives T 0 k A t (α t )dt representing the Agent's discount factor. The Agent aims at choosing an optimal effort α ∈ U to optimize his utility when given a contract ξ proposed by the Principal:
4)
where E α denotes the expectation under the probability measure P α ∈ P defined previously. For any contract ξ, denote M * (ξ) ⊂ U the set of optimal controls of the Agent's problem. The Principal on the other hand takes benefits from the outcome of the controlled process and pays the Agent accordingly. Also, the Agent's participation is conditioned on having his expected return above his reservation utility R, in other words: V A (ξ) ≥ R. In all, the Principal choose a contract among the following set of contracts in order to optimize her own utility:
(2.5)
We will call the contracts in Ξ the implementable contracts. In the case where the Agent has more than one optimal control, we follow the standard convention that the Agent chooses the one that is the best for the Principal. Let k P : [0, T ] × Ω → R be a bounded F-optional function and define K P T := exp − T 0 k P t dt , which represents the discount factor of the Principal. She aims at solving the following optimization
where the function U : R → R is a given non-decreasing and concave utility function and we use the convention sup ∅ = −∞.
Remark 2.1. One of our goals is to generalize the setting of the paper [7] by Cvitanic, Possamaï and Touzi, in which they consider the following system
The drift of the dynamic needs to be in the range of the volatility, which means the system cannot be degenerate.
Motivation
The main motivation of our formulation is to tackle the Principal-Agent problem in a partially observed linear system. Using the above notation, the canonical process B represent the observable process, observed by the Agent and the Principal at the same time. The degenerate part of the system described by the process X represents the filtered process. More precisely, let ν = (α, β) ∈ U be an admissible control. LetX be the unique strong solution of the following linear stochastic differential equation representing the unobservable part of the system:
where µ a unobservable random variable independent of W assumed to be Gaussian with mean and variance m 0 and V 0 , respectively. In addition, we assume that the Principal and the Agent both know m 0 and V 0 . The functions η and σ are deterministic. Furthermore, the observable part of the system is generated by the noisy signal
where W ν is a Brownian motion independent of W and h a deterministic function. Notice that the couple (X, B) is Gaussian and therefore so is the conditional distribution L(X t |B t ), which is characterized by its mean and variance. Denote
for any given admissible control ν. The dynamics of the process X and V are given by the Kalman-Bucy filter as shown in the following proposition, the proof can be found in [3, Chapter 2]. Proposition 2.2. Let ν = (α, β) be an admissible control process. We have the following filter system:
where V is the solution to the ODE:
The process I ν defined by
is a F B -Brownian motion under P ν , and is called the Innovation process.
Clearly under the filtered system (2.8)-(2.9), everything is fully observable, but the system itself becomes degenerate. We aim at solving the following Principal-Agent problem with the convention sup ∅ = −∞:
where β * ∈ M * (ξ) is the optimal response of the Agent given the contract ξ, namely
Section 4.1 below provides an explicit solution for this problem by applying the subsequent results of the Section 2.4. Remark 2.3. Our model is inspired and motivated by the model proposed in [27] , where the observable process is described by
which is actually a special case of our framework, when η = σ = α = 0. Another difference is that they consider an infinite horizon problem, where the contract is given in the form of continuous salary whereas in our framework, the contract consists in a lump-sum payment at the end of the contract.
More generally speaking, one can consider the following partially observed system:
where B andX represent as before the observable process and the unobservable process, respectively. One way to transform the system into an equivalent but fully observable system is to replace the unobservable part by its (unormalized) conditional law described by Zakai equation. In this paper, we shall mainly focus on the finite dimensional case.
Remark 2.4. The moral hazard framework of Principal-Agent problem is also frequently called the second best. The first best corresponds to the case where the Principal and the Agent have the same information. It is typically assumed that the Principal dictates the Agent's actions. Mathematically, the problem becomes a stochastic control problem for a single individual -the Principal. It is well-known that in non-degenerate systems under some mild conditions, the first best coincides with the second best in terms of Principal's value when the Agent's criterion is risk neutral. However, in a partially observed system, the result no longer holds true in general, even in the risk-neutral case. Consider the following example where there is no observable process. The unobservable process follows a SDE:
Clearly, the filtered process is given by X t = m 0 + t 0 α s ds. The Principal aims at optimizing his utility function:
where α * is the optimal response of the Agent given the contract ξ, namely
In the second best case, the Principal has no information and can therefore only offer constant contracts. Agent has no incentive to work and therefore α ≡ 0. Taking into account the participation constraint the optimal contract is a constant payment R at time T where R is Agent's reservation value. The Principal's value in this case is m 0 − R. In the first best case, the Principal observes the Agent's action and therefore the filtered process can be contracted upon. For simplicity, let's consider only linear contracts, i.e. ξ = cX T + d. The Agent's optimal control
As for the Principal, for any given linear contract ξ we have
The inequality becomes equality when c = 1 and d = R − m 0 − T 2 , in which case the Principal's value is increased by T 2 comparing to the moral hazard case.
Main Results
For presentation simplicity, we assume that the Agent's discount factor K A t is equal to 1 for all t ∈ [0, T ]. All the main results can be generalised without much difficulty to the case with
Throughout this paper, we shall impose the following conditions on these coefficients. 
The following assumption ensures that all weak controls P α ∈ P are equivalent and that high order error terms in the variational calculus can be ignored in the non-linear system case.
Assumption 2.6. The Doléans-Dade exponential E α defined in (2.2) is a positive martingale for all α ∈ U . Furthermore, if the controlled system is not linear, namely not in the form of (2.6)-(2.7), there exists p > 2 such that sup
We aim to solve the Agent's problem (2.4) by variational calculus. In the following, for p ≥ 1, P α ∈ P and T > 0, denote
Implicitly, at time t the Hamiltonian may depend on the path of canonical process B ·∧t up to time t. In the following, we will use frequently the partial derivative ∂ a H, ∂ x H, which are derivatives with respect to x and a but not x ′ , a ′ .
Theorem 2.7 (Necessary Condition). Assume that Assumption 2.5 and 2.6 hold true. For a contract ξ ∈ Ξ, let α * ∈ M * (ξ). Then the following FBSDE
has an F-adapted solution, denoted by
Remark 2.8.
1. In the case where η = σ = 0 and b does not depend on x, our formulation is reduced to the framework of Principal-Agent problem studied in [7] in the uncontrolled diffusion case, where the state equations are not degenerate. The FBSDE given in Theorem 2.7 reduces to the BSDE (2.15), which is the same representation of the contract under the optimal probability using the dynamic programming approach. To see that, note that the Hamiltonian in this case becomes
and together with the definition of the optimal control given in (2.19) , the equation (2.15) can be written as
which is the canonical representation of the contract ξ given in [7, Definition 3.2].
2. Since we are working on the weak formulation of stochastic control, it is not surprising that the necessary condition we obtain here does not coincide with the standard stochastic Pontryagin's Maximum Principle (see e.g. [26, 35] ). Comparing to the standard result, the forward-backward system has an extra backward equation (2.15). The process Y in (2.15) indeed characterizes the value function. The adjoint process (2.16) and the forward one (2.18) are similar to those appearing in the standard stochastic maximum principle.
3. The contract ξ appearing in the terminal condition of (2.15) may be path-dependent. To the best of our knowledge, the well-posedness of such FBSDE has not yet been studied in the literature. For further details, we refer the readers to the accompanying paper on the path-dependent FBSDEs [17] . 4 . Another way to see how to obtain the FBSDE (2.15)-(2.18) is to conduct formally the variational calculus by introducing a new state process L representing the change of measure,
and rewrite the Agent's problem as following:
where the controlled system becomes
The standard Hamiltonian associated with the above control problem is given bŷ
The adjoint equations associated with X and L are given by
The process (Y, Z) in (2.22) is actually the equation (2.15) and if we defineP t = Pt Lt and Q t = Qt Lt − Ptbt(Xt,αt) Lt , then the process (P ,Q) satisfies exactly the equation (2.16).
However, there are a few problems in this approach. First of all, since the coefficients of the control system (2.21)-(2.22) are not Lipschitz, to our best knowledge, one cannot directly apply the stochastic maximum principle. Our method provides a way to overcome this problem. Secondly, the newly introduced state variable L is not observable, the contract and the optimal control of the Agent should not depend on L. And finally, note that the convexity of the Hamiltonian (2.20) can be satisfied in very few situations due to the term lzb t (x, a), which makes it tricky to get a useful sufficient condition for the Agent's problem.
Now we give a sufficient condition for the Agent's problem. Define the functional 
We next focus on the Principal's problem. Based on the necessary and the sufficient condition of the Agent's problem, we consider the following sets of contracts: Clearly we have Ξ ⊂ Ξ ⊂ Ξ. Further, we introduce the enlarged optimization of the Principal.
Theorem 2.10. Assume that Assumption 2.5 and 2.6 hold true. Then V P ≤V P . Moreover, if the control problemV P has a solution Z * which satisfies the sufficient condition given in Theorem 2.9, then V P =V P and ξ = Y * T is an optimal contract for V P .
Proofs
Before giving the proof of the necessary condition, we give the following martingale representation theorem which we shall need in a moment. 
where h is a F M -adapted process such that E exp T 0 h t dW t − 1 2 T 0 h 2 t dt = 1. Then for any F M martingale ξ = (ξ t ) 0≤t≤T , there exists a F M -adapted process f such that
Clearly (L t ) 0≤t≤T is a positive uniformly integrable martingale. By Girsanov's theorem, denote Q the probability under which M is a Brownian motion, we have dQ
Since M is now a Brownian motion under the probability Q, by the martingale representation theorem, there exists a F M -adapted process k = (k t ,
The following lemma gives an estimate on the error of the first order approximation of the difference between the solution of (2.1) given two different control α and α ′ . Lemma 3.2. Let α, α ′ be two control processes and X, X ′ be the corresponding solution of (2.1). Denote ∆α := α − α ′ and ∆X := X − X ′ . Let ∆X be the solution of the following linear SDE with initial condition ∆X 0 = 0: d∆X t = ∂ x η t (X ′ By Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality and Jensen inequality, we have
By Grönwall inequality, we get
Now we shall estimate the moments of ∆X. Again, for all p ≥ 2, by Burkholder-Davis-Gundy inequality and Jensen inequality, we have
By Grönwall inequality, we get 
where C is a constant depending on p, T and the coefficients of the SDE (2.1).
We shall now give the proof of Theorem 2.7 in the non-linear system case. Note that in the linear case, ∆X and ∆X defined in the above lemma are the same, which means that there will not be any high order error terms in the variational calculus. Therefore, the estimation of the error terms in step 5 of the following proof will not be necessary for linear system.
Proof of Theorem 2.7 For simplicity, we shall only prove the case where n = d = 1. In higher dimensional case, the proof is essentially the same. Let ξ be an implementable contract such that there exists an F-adapted control α * which optimizes the Agent's expected value. We denote the corresponding state variable X * .
Step 1. Introduce the dynamic version of the value function
is an F-martingale under the probability P α * . By the martingale representation in Lemma 3.1, there exists an F-adapted process Z, such that for all t ∈ [0, T ]
By Assumption 2.5 and [9, Theorem 9.3.5], Z ∈ H 2 T (P α * ).
Step 2. Next we perform a variational calculus around the optimal control α * . Let α ∈ U and for all t ∈ [0, T ] denote ∆α t = α t − α * t . Define α ǫ t := α * t + ǫ∆α t and denote the corresponding state variable by X ǫ . Since the control set U is assumed to be convex, we have α ǫ ∈ U . Denote δα t = ε∆α t , ∆X t = X ε t −X * t ǫ and δX t = ε∆X t . As ξ = Y T , we have
. By the definition of the set of admissible contracts (2.5), we know that · 0 Z t dW α ε t is a true martingale under P α ε . Denote E ε the Radon-Nikodym derivative between P α ε and P α * , namely
Note that since b is bounded, E ε is in L p for all p ≥ 1. Applying Girsanov theorem and together with Taylor expansion on b, we have
Using the fact that P T = 0 and ∆X 0 = 0, we get
Inserting the equation (3.7) and equation (3.8) into (3.6), we get
Now, let ε goes to 0 and by dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
where 1 p + 1 q = 1 2 with p given in Assumption 2.6. As shown in the proof of Lemma 3.2, ∆X ∈ H p T (P α * ) for all p ≥ 2, therefore, the second term of the right hand side of (3.5) is also bounded by Cε 2 for some positive constant C. As for the third term in (3.5), again by Lemma 3.2, using the definition ε∆X t = X ε t − X * t , we have
where 1 p + 1 q = 1 2 with p given in Assumption 2.6 andÊ ε is the Radon-Nikodym derivative between P α ε and the Wiener measure P, namelŷ
Proof of Theorem 2.10 Since the enlarged Principal's problem has a larger admissible contract set, the Principal's value is higher than the initial problem of the Principal. IfV P has an optimal solution ξ * such that the solution Q * of the FBSDE (2.15)-(2.18) satisfies the sufficient condition given by Theorem 2.9, then we know that the control α * defined by (2.19) is indeed the optimal control for the Agent's Problem given this contract ξ * . Therefore, ξ * ∈ Ξ and consequently V P ≥V P . Combined with the first statement of the theorem, we get V P =V P .
Applications
We shall make the following assumption throughout this section. 
Principal-Agent Problem in Partially Observed Linear System
We return to the context in Section 2.3 and aim at solving the Principal-Agent problem (2.12)-(2.13). In addition, we assume that the unobservable processX is non-affected by the Agent's control α. We recall that the controlled state variables follow (2.8)-(2.9) with α ≡ 0 and that the associated Hamiltonian function is given by
The necessary condition by Theorem 2.7 becomes
where β * t = argmin b∈A H(t, X t , b, P t , Q t , Z t ).
(4.4)
The above system describes the contracts under the optimal response of the Agent. The sufficient condition can also be re-written under simpler form:
Let (Y * , Z * , P * , Q * , X * ) be a solution to the system (4.1)-(4.2), where β * satisfies (4.4). Define ξ := Y * T . Then β * is an optimal control if
In particular, in this case ξ ∈ Ξ.
Remark 4.3. We can also obtain the necessary and sufficient condition in the case of exponential utility Agent, the proof and the hypothesis are slightly different, we shall detail them in the Appendix.
Together with Theorem 2.10, we can solve the Principal's problem explicitly. 
Mean Field Interacting Agents in Partially Observed Linear System
In our second application, we consider the Principal-Agent problem in the same partially observed system but with N interacting Agents. As in Section 2.3, we denoteX as the unobservable process and B as the observable, both assumed to be 1-dimensional for simplicity. Agents i = 1, · · · , n have private state processes (X i , B i ) with dynamics
is the mean value of the observables at time t andX is the unique strong solution of
Here, W 1 , · · · , W N , W β 1 , · · · , W β N are independent Brownian motions, and β i is the control chosen by the Agent i. We assume that µ 1 , · · · , µ N are independent Gaussian variables with mean m 0 and variance V 0 . The Principal proposes the same contract ξ to all the Agents. Then the interacting agents agree on a Nash equilibrium in which each Agent cannot improve his utility by deviating unilaterally.
The problem becomes very difficult in general because of the coupling. Note that the observable process B i for Agent i is no longer Gaussian and the filter of X i , namely the conditional law of X i given B i , is no longer described by a finite-dimensional process.
However, as the number of Agents N → ∞, we expect the system to become decoupled, in which case we may be able to learn something about the Nash equilibrium from the corresponding mean field game (MFG).
The Setting of Mean Field Interacting Agent Problem
As before, denoteX the unique strong solution of the following linear stochastic differential equation, which represents the unobservable part of the system. dX t = η(t)X t dt + σ(t)dW t , X 0 = µ.
Let λ ∈ C([0, T ], R) represent the observed population mean, for any β ∈ U , define
By Girsanov theorem, the canonical process B satisfies the following stochastic differential equation under P β :
where W β t is a Brownian motion under P β . Each Agent receives the payment ξ at the maturity T of the contract and aims at optimizing his utility function: A mean field equilibrium is a fixed point of the map λ → Φ(ξ, λ). Denote Θ(ξ) the set of equilibria among the Agents when given the contract ξ satisfying the participation constraint, namely the Agent's value should be above the reservation utility R. The Principal's optimization problem is given by
with the convention sup ∅ = −∞.
Remark 4.6. As discussed in Elie, Mastrolia, Possamaï [13] , we are only going to consider contracts such that the Principal is able to compute the reaction of the Agents. In other words, the set of contracts given which there is at least one Nash equilibrium among the Agents. Indeed, the Principal needs to be able to anticipate how the Agents are going to react to the contracts that he may offer, and will therefore not offer contracts for which Agents cannot agree on an equilibrium.
The Agent's Problem
For any fixed λ ∈ C([0, T ], R), the observable process B in (4.9) is a Gaussian process and the Agent can compute the conditional mean and variance of the unobservable process (X t ) t≥0 using the Kalman filter. Denote as before
Proposition 4.7. Let λ ∈ C([0, T ], R) be the observed population mean and β ∈ U . We have the following filter system:
where I β is the innovation process.
Using the filtered system, the Agent's problem becomes fully observable. We now recall the necessary and sufficient condition for the Agent's problem in this specific case in the two following propositions. 
has a solution, denoted
Besides, for all t ∈ [0, T ], for all b ∈ A, the optimal control β * must verify the local incentive constraint:
Proposition 4.9. Let (Y * , Z * , P * , Q * , X * , B * ) be a solution to the system (4.11)-(4.12) with β * satisfying (4.13). Define ξ := Y * T . Then β * is an optimal control if for all t ∈ [0, T ], ,
where Y is defined by the equation (4.11). As before, we have Ξ ⊂ Ξ ⊂ Ξ and the enlarged optimization of the Principal is given bȳ Theorem 4.10. Assume that Assumption 4.1 holds true and assume that ∂ b c(t, ·) is surjective. Denoteβ * (t) = (∂ b c(t, ·)) −1 (ρ t +1). There exists an optimal contract for the Principal's problem in the mean field setting, which is given by
where (X,B, V ) are solutions of the following system of forward equations:
dX t = η(t)X t dt + h(t)V (t)B t (dB t − (h(t)B tXt +β * (t))dt)X 0 = m 0 , (4.16) dB t dt = k(t)B t +β * tB 0 = 0, (4.17)
(4.18)
Proof For notation simplicity, denotē
By (4.12), at equilibrium we have dB t dt = k(t)B t +β t . Replacing B T and Y T = ξ in (4.15) by the representations in (4.11) and (4.12), we get
Notice that the inequality above becomes equality if and only if β * is deterministic.
Step 1. Solve the deterministic control problem sup β T 0 k(t)B t +β t − c(t,β t ) dt , (4.20)
whereB satisfies (4.19) . It follows from the Pontryagin maximum principle that the optimal controlβ * is:β * (t) = (∂ b c(t, ·)) −1 (ρ t + 1), (4.21) where ρ is the adjoint process: dρ t dt = −k(t)(ρ t + 1), ρ T = 0,
Step 2.V P is attained if the optimal control of the Agent is deterministic and is given by (4.21), now we need to check if such a contract exists and belongs to Ξ. Under the controlβ * (t), the processB follows: dB t dt = k(t)B t + (∂ b c(t, ·)) −1 (ρ t + 1).
In order forβ * (t) to be the optimal control of the agent, by (4.13) we must have
Inserting the above equality into the equation of P and we get dP t = h(t)B tβ * (t) − η(t)P t dt + Q t dI β * t ,
and a trivial solution of the BSDE is given by (P , 0), whereP is the solution of the ODE: dP t dt = h(t)B tβ * (t) − η(t)P t withP T = 0.
So far we find a solution to the system (4.11)-(4.12). Define the contract:
ξ := T 0 c(t,β * (t))dt + (β * (t) − V (t)h(t)B t P t )(dB t − h(t)B tXt dt),
whereX is the solution of the following SDE: dX t = η(t)X t dt + h(t)V (t)B t (dB t − (h(t)B t X t +β * (t))dt), X 0 = m 0 .
Clearly,β * (t) is the best effort of the agent under the contract ξ, and the sufficient condition for the Agent's problem is verified since Q = 0, i.e. ξ ∈ Ξ. We conclude by using Theorem 2.10.
Appendix
In this section we shall detail the additional hypothesis and the proof of necessary condition for the Agent's problem in the case of exponential utility in the partially observed linear system. The controlled system is given by (2.8)-(2.9). The Agent's problem that we consider becomes
To guarantee integrability, we shall need additional assumptions on the set of admissible contracts. For convenience, we say that a strictly positive local martingale (M t ) t∈[0,T ] satisfies the condition (H) if it is uniformly integrable and there exists p ∈ (1, ∞) and K p > 0 constant depending only on p such that for every stopping time τ ,
In light of Lemma 5.4, without ambiguity, we say a F B -adapted process Z ∈ BM O if there exists P ν ∈ P such that · 0 Z t dI ν t ∈ BM O(P ν ) . Here we introduce a notation: for an F B -adapted process Z satisfying sufficient integrability condition, we denote
